After official meetings on the ground he, as befits a diplomat of high rank, in rather smooth phrases would give a brief assessment of events and the results of the talks. And up in the air, on board the plane, Igor Ivanov usually walked into our cabin already without a tie, in a sports suit or jeans. It was here that informal conversations took place in which the minister would change a language of diplomatic protocol into a generally comprehensible one, detailing (at times what they call "off," that is not for the press) what he had not had time to say on on the ground hot on the heels of events.

Understandably, the range of key international issues with which Russian diplomacy is concerned is not limited to this. There are also Europe, the CIS, China, Iraq, the Korean Peninsula, and other points where this time the minister's plane did not land, but where Moscow intently looks. The forty hours spent in the air during this December flight around the world of Igor Ivanov is a sufficient time to try to look from an altitude of 10 thousand meters at the map of the world, which is, strictly speaking, the "zone of operation" of Russian foreign policy in the outgoing year. One hour of these forty the minister dedicated to answers to the questions from RG Deputy Editor-in-Chief V. N. Dymarsky.

Answer: From the point of view of potential implications for our foreign policy and for the situation in the world I would put Russian relations with the United States in the first place. This year we have managed to go through a very complex period associated with the Americans' unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and not only not to slide down to confrontation, which for Russia would have entailed many unpleasant moments, but also to preserve the constructive partner mindset. That was what enabled us in a very short time to arrive at the signing of the new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, giving for the coming decade the real prospects for having them cut down by almost three times, and to sign the important political declaration where the principles are set up between our countries in major areas for Russia - political, military and economic. All of this made it possible to continue our joint efforts in the struggle against international terrorism, and not just in Afghanistan.

Question: Despite the assurances of the politicians, who speak much about the rapprochement of Russia and the US, one has the impression that both sides, while declaring the hitherto unseen level of partnership, have not departed from the previous logic of confrontation. Outwardly we are a sort of friends, but inwardly we still view each other as opponents.

Answer: Probably in the United States, including in the US administration, there are those who still live in the perceptions of the Cold War, in the approaches of unilateral advantages. Naturally this affects the interests not only of Russia, but also of many other countries, including the closest allies of the United States. But there are in the US administration supporters of a multilateral approach too. They understand that the United States, objectively the most economically and militarily powerful state, cannot live in isolation and hope - especially after September 11 - to solve all the issues completely on its own. I think that in US society, including in the political elite, there goes the confrontation between these two principal, but not sole tendencies, which at times reflects on US foreign policy as well. Still, President Bush not only declares, but also pursues in practice a course based on a multilateral approach. Hence the results of which I spoke. This does not mean that all is running smoothly between us and America, and that there are no differences at all. They do exist and bear an objective as well as a subjective character. For it is quite obvious and natural that there is a non-concurrence of interests, a difference in evaluations and approaches to some or other events. But one should not dramatize the situation.

Something like that is also occurring in Russian society. Some of the politicians hold that we have no weighty grounds to speak of a partner relationship with the US, citing examples of how America acts exclusively in its own interests, to the prejudice of the interests of Russia. Wrenched out of their context, these examples might be interpreted in just this way. But the point is that in politics you cannot consider individual facts or events outside their interconnection. Most clearly this manifested itself with the appearance of the US military in Central Asia. Some of our politicians hastened to claim that the United States would take advantage of the Afghan developments to bolster their positions in a strategically important region for Russia. That is, a sort of expansion. But let's recall what there was before that. We had constantly been indicating that the threat to our interests, a real threat at that, was coming from the south, primarily from the territory of Afghanistan. It is clear that Russia could hardly have tackled the task of eliminating the seat of terrorism in Afghanistan on its own, single-handedly. It had been accomplished by the efforts of the international coalition. Have our southern borders become more secure as a result? Absolutely. Although problems remain - both narcotics and emigration. But from the vantage point of national security, of course, this flank has been greatly strengthened. Yes, we have to make compromises, one of them has been the appearance in this region of US, and not only US, servicemen who are solving the task connected with the international operation in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the decisions to provide their territories for the Americans were taken by sovereign states. The so-called bloc discipline has receded into the past together with the opposing blocs themselves. And today it is just wrong and erroneous to expect that one can still dictate decisions to this or that state. It is feasible and possible to build relations with neighbors which would take into account the interests of each other. What's needed is not so much to be afraid of expansion by whomsoever, as to act vigorously ourselves. And then neither in politics, nor in the military domain will there form a vacuum which is filled in by the representatives of other states.

Another example - the ABM Treaty. We had sought to have it preserved. However, a treaty is a treaty. If it provides for the possibility of withdrawal, then neither we nor somebody else has the means of influence to prevent this. We had not departed from our principles, we had firmly struggled for the preservation of the treaty but the Americans had acted in their own way. And here the new approaches showed themselves in our foreign policy. If something like that had occurred, say, 10 or 20 years ago, we would inevitably have come to confrontation, would have started to look for asymmetrical or some other responses, that is, everything would have proceeded through an arms race. We, by contrast, were able in a not simple situation to bring the United States to negotiations and achieve a treaty which meets our interests and the interests of international stability. In other words, we did move forward, not backward.

Question: You said that 10 or 20 years ago something like that would have been impossible. But didn't the turning point set in after September 11?

Answer: It seems to me that September 11 was rather a stage which influenced not so much the shaping of the foreign policy of Russia as the way of thinking and conduct of the United States and of the West generally. Thus, for years we had spoken of the threat emanating from Afghanistan because we had had personal experience of that, had known that it was from there that arms and financial support were coming, and that gunmen were being trained there. But they hadn't listened much to us, since they held that Afghanistan wasn't their problem. And if this was worrying Russia, if it was its problem, then let it take trouble over that. Now things like this also happen, but the understanding of the need for greater solidarity in the face of new threats is gathering momentum.

Question: What second event will you name among the most important?

Answer: In significance for our foreign policy I would put the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the second place. Perhaps, it has not yet declared itself in full voice because it is only going through its formative period. But in geography of reach and in configuration the SCO carries a big potential with it. Russia, China and four Central Asian states form the organization, and in this way we are creating the conditions for secure development on our southern and Far Eastern borders. In addition, the SCO has been established not only in the interests of the fight against terrorism, although this is one of its priority tasks, but also to implement large economic projects. It is self-evident how important this is for Siberia and our Far East. In terms of the mechanism of functioning the organization has not yet picked pace but it already has statutory documents and its secretariat and other structures are being formed. And already a huge interest is being shown in it, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, there is the official statement of India's wish to join the SCO as an observer or a full-fledged member. Negotiations are being conducted for the establishment of contacts between the SCO and ASEAN, and between the SCO and other regional structures. This evidences the potential capabilities of the organization and its future role in the Asian and Pacific space.

Question: What comes third in the minister's rating?

Answer: The adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 1441 on Iraq. It is no secret that the skeptics had far outnumbered the optimists regarding the possibility of reaching consensus in the situation in which this document was being adopted. Proceeding from the present membership of the Security Council, a variety of speculations were then afoot, people claimed that the draft resolution was doomed, that it would not get a majority, that a veto would be imposed on it... Nevertheless, literally on the last night before the meeting consensus was found, which, of course, in a way removed acuteness from the Iraq problem. This does not mean that it has been definitively solved, as we, of course, are not insured against a new crisis. But that it has been possible to carry the resolution through attests to the fundamentally new situation evolving in the world.

The world community is coming to understand the necessity to act jointly in dealing with acute international problems. For until recently the split in the Security Council had been ably exploited by those who had for some or other reasons been fulfilling their international obligations in bad faith. The unanimous adoption of the resolution, first, strengthens the positions of international observers, and second, shows Iraq that there's no room for turning maneuvers - either it has to comply with the resolution or bear responsibility for its violation.

Third, it is important for the UN itself and the Security Council. I remember how at the Millennium Summit in New York many would claim that the United Nations for objective reasons (thus, its Charter actually has not been changed since the founding of the organization) was starting to fall behind events, was losing its capabilities. In some ways, I think, they are right, reforms are needed, of course, the adaptation of the UN to today's realities, but at the same time the organization remains a unique mechanism, an instrument for solving acute international problems. That's why the resolution on Iraq became an act of moral and psychological support of the UN.

Question: Now let us move to less pleasant things. What is it that you are not satisfied with in the past year?

Answer: Let me also name three things here.

The first - not all our desires have been realized in the CIS sector. It can't be said that we have accomplished nothing, that we stand still. Movement is there, and in some areas quite substantial. There has been strengthened the Eurasian Economic Community, a real structure for economic cooperation. The Collective Security Treaty has been transformed into an international organization. Still, I would have liked to see more harmony, effectiveness, consistency and concrete results. In a word, this is the line to which, in my view, it is necessary to devote even more attention in 2003.

Further. We could have tried to achieve more in relations with the European Union. Here too we aren't moving backward, but forward. But I would have liked more. I see both the objective and subjective reasons for our dissatisfaction. Those objective are linked to the complex process of the enlargement of the European Union itself. Only in December of 2002 did this process took on the outline of a decision, and before that there had been going on a very tense internal discussion which, of course, held back the activity of the EU on other tracks, including the Russian. This told on reforms within the European Union as well. In particular, in questions of security and foreign policy, where certain internal complexities were also observed. However, we shouldn't put the blame entirely on the other side alone. Evidently we too did not always exert sufficiently vigorous efforts.

The third point. We cannot but be worried by the unsettled nature of the regional conflicts along the perimeter of Russia's borders. First of all, it is Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Transnistria. Despite our considerable efforts, to speak of real advancement here is not possible thus far. And this, of course, is a serious factor complicating our activity both in the Caucasus and within the CIS as a whole. And we have to look in a more creative, nonstandard way for answers to these questions.

Question: From time to time the talk arises of a need to revise the concept of foreign policy. Although the impression is that it has already been "revised" by the very course of events after September 11, by the formation of the antiterrorist coalition.

Answer: Around any concept discussions are being conducted, there are always pessimists and skeptics. Some people altogether hold that no concepts are needed.

Today, when after the passage of time it is possible to draw certain conclusions, I am convinced that the concept was necessary, that it helped us build a clearly, more comprehensible, predictable foreign policy.

At the same time the concept is not a dogma. Life is fast changing, there appears a lot that's new and unexplored. But this doesn't mean that a concept has to be adopted each year. There exist other forms of "quick reaction" to changes - the messages and appeals of the President, documents of a different character, which help correct promptly some or other lines of Russian foreign policy.

Of course, renewed concept will be required at some stage. I, for example, believe that this can occur after each presidential election. The head of state, whether new or reelected, must present his vision of foreign policy, and not just foreign, for the coming four years.

As to the antiterrorist coalition, in a way, of course, it formed spontaneously, as a reaction to the tragic events. And now too we face a very serious choice - either this coalition will be, as attempts are at times being made to present it, an association of states sharing the approaches of the United States on questions of principle and rendering it support, or it will become an association of states enjoying equal rights which jointly work out assessments, approaches and methods of solving particular problems.

We stand, naturally, for the second approach. And it leads us to the definition contained in the concept, that of a multipolar world. One can call it anything. But what's the essence? That after September 11 and other cataclysms, posing a serious threat to peace, the international community felt the need for joint actions - from natural fear of being left one-on-one with such a threat as terrorism.

And that coalition has formed up. It's unlikely that it will be given some shape, that it will become an organization with its own rules, with its own mechanism of functioning. This is rather a philosophy, the philosophy of solidarity in the face of some or other threats. How much will it be possible to refine this philosophy into some practical forms of cooperation? A struggle is revolving around this today. That's why we treat with so much restraint unilateral actions which run counter to the philosophy of present-day international life. Out of our approach, for example, there was born the Quartet on the Middle East. Apparently, a totally unexplainable configuration - Russia, the US, EU and UN - but it arose from understanding of the fact that by acting all apart, nothing can be achieved. Maybe this experience will get its development in other crisis situations and conflicts as well.

Question: Back to the foreign policy concept - are there any basic elements which have to remain immutable in all the changes?

Question: Surely. First, foreign policy has to ensure the country's security. If there is no security, if you are in a condition of facing a constant threat from the outside, then all the rest recedes into the background.

Second, the provision of favorable external conditions for economic and social development. That is, conditions which would enable concentrating the available potential on the solution of internal problems. Our country to a significant extent is self-sufficient, and so the concentration of internal resources must ensure serious economic and social advancement.

Third, the protection of the rights and interests of our co-citizens. This is lobbying, in the good sense of the word, for our economic interests, for our business abroad and it is also the promotion of our culture and the defense of the rights of our citizens.

Such are, in my view, the three major postulates. They can change their configuration or be put in other words, but must remain immutable. And then the following question arises: How are we to achieve this? In different historical conditions at different historical stages different answers are worked out too. There can be variations here.

Question: What do you expect from 2003?

Answer: We have to consolidate the positive tendencies that have shown themselves in the outgoing year 2002. First of all, the issue is about what we started our conversation with - the spirit of solidarity in the international community. Acute problems remain - Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Korean Peninsula... The main thing is not to allow these conflicts to lead to consequences which could seriously undermine the foundations of international security - but, on the contrary, we should push them onto a track of political settlement.

For us, of course, it will be a priority task to strengthen the mechanisms and institutions in the post-Soviet space in every way. This encompasses the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty, the Eurasian Economic Community and relations with Belarus.

We will continue, of course, our efforts for solving global problems. We will strive to keep and develop the constructive processes on the front of struggle against international terrorism and with regard to ensuring strategic stability.

Sometimes people say: But why should Russia participate in everything? Maybe we should limit our actions to the sectors which directly affect the interests of the country? Such an approach does not take into account the situation in the context of globalization. The contemporary world is very interdependent and interrelated. Security is indeed today more indivisible than hardly ever before. In support of this thesis I will cite but one example - the entry of Switzerland into the United Nations.

Is any further proof necessary that a common understanding has formed in the world of the need for collective efforts and of the indivisibility of security.

The poll was carried out from November 22 to 25, 2002, among 1,600 Russians in 83 population centers in 33 regions of the country.

-The signing of the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and of the Agreement on the Legal Status of the Organization.

-The strengthening of the Eurasian Economic Community and the formation of the Customs Union and a common economic space on its basis. The accession to the Community of Ukraine and Moldova as observers.

-The holding of the first meeting of the heads of the five Caspian states. The signing of the Russian-Kazakhstan and Russian-Azerbaijani documents on the delineation of the contiguous sections of the bed of the Caspian Sea.

-Substantial progress in the elaboration of a new framework for relations between Russia and the United States of America. The signing of the Russia-US Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and of the Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship.

-The creation of a new mechanism of cooperation between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance - the Russia-NATO Council.

-The elaboration of a mutually acceptable compromise with the European Union on passenger transit between Russia and the Kaliningrad region. The further strengthening of the partnership between Russia and the EU in the areas of security, economy, energy and in other fields. The development of bilateral relations with Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and other EU member states.

-The strengthening of the full status of Russia in the G8, and the decision on the inclusion of Russia into the cycle of rotating chairmanship of this forum. Agreement reached within the G8 on the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

-The strengthening of the strategic partnership with China, and the entry of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation with the PRC into force.

-The further development of multifarious cooperation with India.

-The holding of the first summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in St. Petersburg and the signing of the Charter of the SCO and the Agreement on the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure.

-The adoption by the United States and the European Union of a decision to recognize the market status of the Russian economy. The removal of Russia from the "black list" of FATF. The raising of the credit rating of Russia within the OECD.



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