www.gazeta.ru,  www.mosnews.com
By Yelena Rudneva

Chechen residents will go to the polls later this summer to elect a new president. However, the turnout may prove to be significantly lower than that registered last year when Akhmad Kadyrov was elected president. And this is just one of the various challenges faced by the Kremlin, its candidate Alu Alkhanov and the Kadyrov clan that has nominated his candidacy, Sergei Khaikin, director of the Institute for Social Marketing, told Gazeta.Ru.
Khaikin’s think-tank is the only institute that regularly conducts public opinion polls in Chechnya.

- Last week Alu Alkhanov, head of the Chechen Interior Ministry officially registered as a candidate for the presidency in Chechnya. Being the only contender to have met Putin, Alkhanov is considered the unconditional favorite, even more so since he also has the support of Ramzan Kadyrov, the son to Akhmad Kadyrov slain in on 9 May in a terror attack. What can be said of Alkahnov’s popularity with Chechen voters?
- Most say Alkhanov is a good man. You will not hear any negative judgments about him in Chechnya. There is a word “Ko’nakh” in the Chechen language. It means a truly noble person, a ’knight’.
Many say that Alkhanov qualifies for that definition. He is young, strong, with his life story well known to the Chechens. Many remember the 1996 siege when Alkhanov defended a train station and led his men out of encirclement.
He is seen as a consistently pro-Russian man, who at the same time has a highly delicate approach to his people’s ethnic routes and traditions. Also it is very important that his relatives behave themselves correctly.
- What do you mean by that?
- Considering their status, the relatives of the interior minister have behaved themselves decently. After all in Chechnya everyone knows everything. Such behavior on their part appeals to the people.
One person told me during an interview that if he had a relative holding the post of an interior minister, he would not talk with me directly. He would travel around accompanied by bodyguards and live in Moscow! Alkhanov’s relatives are not like that. They are open to everyone.
As you understand this is not typical for Chechnya, as well as for Russia as a whole. Alkhanov belongs to a real Chechen teip (clan) and a good working family, and this, of course, appeals to his potential supporters.
- But will the fact that he has already enlisted the support of the Kremlin and the United Russia party, and was nominated by Kadyrov’s clan appeal to the voters?
- Of course, in this regard he is likely to encounter certain problems. The point is that in Chechnya the time has come to build. People want to turn over the page of history, and they would not like to see a military leader but a builder of a peaceful life as their president.
The time has come to create jobs, and Alkhanov will have to be more of crisis manager than a general. But there is something that can help him win popularity. During Kadyrov’s reign the corruption rate soared in the republic. In this respect Alkhanov holds a trump card — if he builds his election campaign on a crackdown on corruption, this will be a great advantage.
- But who will trust him if Kadyrov’s protege is trying to extirpate the corruption among those who want to see him come to power?
- This is yet another problem the future candidate is likely to face. Alkhanov is a loyal and allegiant team player. Also, everyone remembers how Alkhanov publicly said he owed his appointment to Akhmad-Haji (Kadyrov) and to Ramzan. That is why one of my misgivings is his dependence on Ramzan. However, once elected, he would have such powers that he has never had before.
- And is it really that crucial for the Chechens to have a president that is independent?
- Of course, it is a president after all. The Chechens consider the most important function of the head of the state to be the ability to represent the people in Russia and abroad, and to assert its interests. People believe that Ramzan Kadyrov’s influence will diminish after the new president is elected, whoever the new president is. Perhaps those who oversee Alkhanov’s election campaign do not share that view. For instance, he was nominated from Tsentoroi, the native village of Kadyrov, and he is introduced to the people as a member of Kadyrov’s team. I do not think that local residents will unanimously support that nomination. At the same time, voters in the Urus-Martan district, where Alkhanov comes from, will gladly back him. We plan to carry out more surveys, and will see how people will treat Alkhanov in comparison with the other candidates.
- How can you explain State Duma deputy Ruslan Yamadayev’s decision not to run for presidency?
- It is difficult to say for sure. Perhaps that is not his final decision, there is still time. After all, he has a powerful clan behind him, and this amounts to a substantial advantage, but at the same time a great disadvantage. Ruslan Yamadayev faces the same problems as Ramzan Kadyrov and the other commanders.
Any person with a long military record has those who seek blood vengeance on them, which complicates their lawful political campaign and active public activity. Besides, it would be strange if that militarized clan, supported by United Russia, engaged in confrontation with Kadyrov’s team.
- And what is the attitude of Chechens’ towards the federal center? Do the federal authorities enjoy high popularity ratings, judging by the latest opinion polls?
- We conducted a poll in which we asked which of the politicians in Moscow and on the federal level people trust most? It turned out that 20 percent trust Putin, who is followed by a group of liberal politicians: Nemtsov and Khakamada each enjoy the support of 6 percent of respondents, Yavlinsky — 4 percent.
It is clear why people name them, because they expressed sympathy for the people of Chechnya and spoke of their problems. And Chechens do not forget such things.
They are followed by twenty other politicians who scarcely score more than 1 percent. Those include [Communist leader Gennady] Zyuganov, [United Russia chairman and State Duma speaker Boris] Gryzlov, Gennady Troshev, and many others. Some 40 percent of respondents do not trust anyone, while 20 percent are undecided.
It turns out that despite the general skepticism as regards the federal politicians, Putin’s rating in Chechnya remains high.
I would like to recall that the latest poll was held shortly after the [9 May] terrorist act, between 14-19 May. Perhaps, that could have somehow affected the responses. Kadyrov’s death prompted many to say that it amounted to the collapse of Putin’s and the Kremlin’s policy in Chechnya.
This is not so. Indeed, Akhmad-Haji Kadyrov’s record before his election as president was highly complicated: he used to serve as a mufti and called for Gazavat (holy war) on Russia in the Maskhadov times. Then came his harsh verbal attacks on Wahhabi fundamentalism, and loyalty to the federal center. Of course, he had a lot of foes. The degree of danger he was in was many times higher than that of all the other candidates.
Still, I disagree with the assertion that Kadyrov’s death proved that the Kremlin’s policy failed. People tend to agree that a peaceful life is beginning in Chechnya. A year ago the main demand the Chechen people made was the withdrawal of federal troops, whereas today what is most important is the creation of jobs.
During his rule Kadyrov considerably strengthened his power in Chechnya. A year ago, when asked who, in their opinion, holds the reins of power in the republic, people said, the military and the federal center; today they say, it is the president, the government and the local government bodies.
Indeed, today, after his death, Akhmad-Haji is perceived in a much better light than before. He has a halo of a martyr, just like [Zelimkhan] Yandarbiyev.
We asked our respondents whether they thought Kadyrov had done more good or bad for the republic during his presidency. People said he had done more good (60 percent), 35 percent said he did just as much good as bad, and some 5 percent said that he had done more bad.
Of course, the positive evaluation may be over overstated, since the poll was carried out shortly after his death. But people appreciate that they can safely walk the streets of Grozny or travel across the republic to attend a wedding or funeral on the other side of Chechnya.
- Would it be true to say that people are convinced that the Kremlin-backed candidate will win the race and that is why the election campaign is void of any intrigue?
- The new election is likely to be held under the same old scheme already tested during the previous presidential poll and the constitutional referendum. Ballots were cast mostly by those who supported Kadyrov and the draft constitution. Hence, over 90 percent of the votes cast were in their favor.
- Those against merely abstained from vote. But the turnout in the April 2003 referendum was quite high, as compared with the presidential election held in October last year, when the voters were no longer as active. If this time the voters are offered no real alternative, the number of those willing to cast their ballots may decline seriously.
- What do people think of the presidential security service, manned for the most part by former rebels?
- The Chechen public assumes that the rumors concerning the belligerent plans of the military formations controlled by Ramzan Kadyrov are over-exaggerated.
For the most part they are people who were dragged out of the woods where they had found themselves against their will. Akhmad-Haji Kadyrov had in fact led them out of the woods under a personal pledge to ensure their safety.
And Ramzan today is the successor to that pledge, but not to the presidency. Many liberal-minded political scientists censured Kadyrov, saying he should not have armed the former rebels; on the contrary, they ought to have been banned from touching weapons ever again.
But people in Chechnya often say that Kadyrov had given the former rebels jobs, there is nothing else they could do in the republic. Unemployment is rampant. By giving them jobs he was able to keep an eye on them, he gave them salaries, a chance to help their families.
Our respondents believe that the former rebels had no motives, neither religious, nor moral to go to the woods where they were starving and freezing. Most of those people had never really been Wahhabites. All they need is a guarantee of a peaceful life and of personal safety.