25 May 2004 12:37 Possible candidates in upcoming Chechen presidential election profiled The Kremlin is still undecided on its Chechen presidtenial candidate but many are inclined to support a member of
late President Kadyrov's family. Meanwhile, Kadyrov's opponents see the presidential elections as an
opportunity to constrain the rapidly-growing independence of Chechnya and its new elite. The following is text of report
by Russian newspaper Vremya Novostey on 20 May.
During the second week of mourning for Akhmat Kadyrov, the deceased president of Chechnya, contenders for the
"hot" vacancy finally made their wishes known.
The first to announce his firm intention to run for office in the upcoming election was Bislan Gantamirov, former
mayor of Groznyy, one of the founders of the pro-Russian Chechen militia, and the minister of the press in
Kadyrov's government. When he was still a minister, Mr Gantamirov told a Vremya Novostey correspondent that he
would "determine the outcome of the election". People in the Kremlin disagreed, however: Akhmat Kadyrov had
been chosen to win long before the election. Gantamirov's subsequent behaviour looked suicidal: He did not enter
the race himself, but he did openly support Moscow businessman Khuseyn Dzhabrailov while he was still serving as
Kadyrov's minister of the press. He was dismissed from his government position without delay, and Khuseyn
Dzhabrailov dropped out of the race shortly afterward.
The Dzhabrailov family later won a consolation prize: Khuseyn's brother Umar became the senator from Chechnya.
He said the family would no longer participate directly in future elections. Mr Gantamirov, on the other hand, has
decided to try his luck. His past as a rebel fighter, his authority among pro-Russian groups, and his standing in the
anti-Kadyrov opposition probably will keep him from becoming Kadyrov's successor, however. The "general
line" in Chechen affairs is defined by Deputy Chief of Kremlin Staff Vladislav Surkov, who, judging by all
indications, has no wish for any conflicts with the Kadyrov "family".
This "family," represented by Sergey Abramov, the acting president of the republic, Ramzan Kadyrov,
Abramov's first deputy, and Taus Dzhabrailov, speaker of the State Council, is currently spending much of its time
in Moscow, conducting "intense consultations". The Central Electoral Commission has tentatively agreed to
their recommendation that the election be scheduled for 22 or 29 August instead of the first Sunday in September for a
symbolic link with Akhmat Kadyrov's birthday (23 August). They even appear to have chosen an heir to the
"Kadyrov team" at a conference in the presidential administration at the end of last week: According to Vremya
Novostey 's sources, their choice is Chechen Minister of Internal Affairs Alu Alkhanov.
There will be no problems with the "security component" in this case: 46-year-old Police Maj-Gen Alu
Alkhanov currently has jurisdiction over more than 10,000 subordinates. Right after Akhmat Kadyrov was killed, Vladimir
Putin personally ordered the augmentation of this number by another 1,125 officers. Kadyrov's "guard",
whose exact numerical strength noone knows, is formally subordinate to the [Chechen] Ministry of Internal Affairs, and
Ramzan himself is a police senior lieutenant and deputy minister of internal affairs.
There is no question that Alu Alkhanov is a Kadyrov man and could guarantee political continuity on this basis. He
was appointed to his present office in April last year, after the resignation of Ruslan Tsakayev, who was in that office
for about half a year. Tsakayev, who was recruited for the head office of the Prosecutor-General's Office and was
promoted to the rank of general, was Chechnya's first police minister. The federal centre accepted him as a
compromise after Akhmat Kadyrov had political differences with Gen Said-Selim Peshkhoyev. Tsakayev did not suit the
republic leader either, however, particularly after he categorically objected to the hiring of surrendered rebels as
police officers. He had to resign in April last year, and he died of a heart attack just two weeks later.
After that, the Chechen Interior Ministry finally was headed by someone acceptable to Kadyrov - Alu Alkhanov, then
still a police colonel. He fought against Dudayev in the first war, then worked in the transport police, and heroically
led his subunit out of rebel-occupied Groznyy in the terrible days of August 1996. The second war put him back in his
earlier job as chief of the Chechen Internal Affairs Directorate for Transportation. Alu Alkhanov was a complaisant
politician. He accepted Kadyrov's rules of play without reservation and boldly notified the centre that the Chechen
Interior Ministry was making every effort to cleanse its ranks. Meanwhile, the rumours of police corruption and the
rapidly rising cost of getting a job as an ordinary traffic policeman subsided only occasionally, whenever stern
commissions from the internal security service of the federal ministry came to Chechnya. Their inspections did not
produce any appreciable results, however, and the Kremlin decided not to bother Akhmat Kadyrov anymore.
If that attitude has not changed, and if it extends to Kadyrov's "family", Mr Alkhanov definitely
could be viewed as the Kremlin's candidate. The fact that his job has given him no exposure as a public politician
is the least of the strategists' worries: after all, the October election in Chechnya proved that this
characteristic can be corrected. This time, however, it will be more difficult: Alkhanov is almost unknown, and there is
so little time left.
The fact that some officials in Moscow disagree with the continuation of this general line is much more important.
Last September, then head of the presidential administration Aleksandr Voloshin managed to convince Kadyrov's
enemies, most of whom were in the law-enforcement community, that his victory was the only possible solution. Now many
of Kadyrov's opponents see a chance to correct the situation and to restrict the rapidly growing independence of
Chechnya and its new elite. After the idea of direct rule was immediately rejected by the president, the hard-liners
will have to start looking for a "non-Kadyrov" candidate.
Aside from Mr Gantamirov, there are several others. During the first days after Kadyrov's death, there were
suspicions that the appointment of another former mayor of Groznyy, FSB career officer Oleg Zhitkov, as the deputy of
the president's "southern" plenipotentiary representative for Chechnya was no coincidence. Police Gen
Peshkhoyev, who is willing in principle, as he put it, to enter the race, was mentioned in a similar context.
Meanwhile, the theory of the prosecutor's office investigating the terrorist act in the Dinamo Stadium [on 9
May], suggesting that a Kadyrov bodyguard may have been involved in the murder, sounded like a warning to the current
Chechen regime. Incidentally, this theory was brought up again during closed hearings in the Duma yesterday by federal
Minister of Internal Affairs Rashid Nurgaliyev. The possibility of sending additional forces from the federal Interior
Ministry to Chechnya was also discussed there.
The government is avoiding public displays of its uncertainty, so all of the information pertaining to the case is
carefully "restricted". The list of contenders will continue to grow, however, as long as they think there is
no consensus in the Kremlin with regard to a specific candidate. Some of the participants in the last campaign, who had
to drop out in line with the "party plan", are considering another run - for example, prominent businessman
Malik Saydullayev. Incidentally, the government party has also promised to participate in the election. The United
Russia candidate has not been named yet, but the party has a respectable executive committee chairman in Chechnya -
State Duma Deputy Ruslan Yamadayev, a former Ichkerian general. No-one knows whether any of these politicians will be a
worthy successor to Akhmat Kadyrov, but there is a slim hope that the present absence of a single uncompromising stance
will lead not to destabilization, but to the actual choice of a worthy republic leader. In any case, it is obvious that
the job of president of Chechnya is the most dangerous presidential position in Russia.
[Vremya Novostey] |