After the death of Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov, Moscow is the only pretender to power in the republic.

Oleg Khrabry

The bomb stuck a year ago in the concrete below the grandstand at Grozny’s Dinamo Stadium, based on a 152mm artillery shell, went off on May 9th during a Victory Day celebration. With the death of Chechnya’s president Ahmad Kadyrov and the chair of the republic’s State Council Hussein Isaev, and the serious injury of Valery Baranov, the commander of the united troops, the mojaheds, seemingly backed into a corner, scored one of their biggest victories. Everything points to the fact that the bomb would have exploded regardless of who was standing on the grandstand on that fateful day. The Chechen president had not planned to attend the May 9th parade.
That day, Chechnya not only lost its president, who had already survived dozens of assassination attempts, completely by accident; it also suffered a blow to its new system of rule, established at great pains. As this system had been created exclusively under Kadyrov, it is logical to assume that with his death the republic will have to set up this complex system of checks and balances anew. Most importantly, it is absolutely necessary to seek and find a worthy candidate for this mission. The situation is further complicated by the peculiarities of the Chechen system itself. The republic’s political playing field has been trampled and all strong candidates have become outsiders to its political and economic processes. Kadyrov was suspiciously flexible in negotiating with his Chechen opponents and was always ready to forgive old sins, yet he did not permit any political competition in Chechnya at all. Thus, not a single new politician, be they local Russians or Moscow Chechens, became a real political contender that both Kadyrov and Moscow would have taken seriously.

Smoldering embers

A month ago, Kadyrov made it clear that he was willing to personally secure Putin’s pardon of Ichkerian president Aslan Maskhadov if Maskhadov would give himself up. Meanwhile, the secret service division under Ramzan Kadyrov spent the entire spring pursuing other members of his movement. Ichkeria’s Minister of Defense Magomed Khanbiev only turned himself in after his relatives had been taken hostage in early March. Kadyrov personally guaranteed his safety and managed to win him over to his side. In an interview, Khanbiev related how warmly his men were greeted by Ramzan, who showed him all the honors due a real defense minister.
We will never know what kind of arguments Kadyrov found to turn former guerilla fighters into supporters, but this targeted psychological attack yielded surprising results. During March and April, in addition to the minister of defense, he wooed the former director of Ichkeria’s special division Boris Aidamirov, director of the guard Shaa Turlaev, and bodyguard Magomed Kazaev away from Maskhadov. The amnesty period in Chechnya has already elapsed, and Kadyrov personally guaranteed the immunity of Maskhadov’s surrendered supporters.
With his death, their fate hangs by a thread. Even worse, the assassination, according to federal authorities, was successful because Kadyrov’s circle included many who showed false loyalty while biding their time, waiting for the right moment to get rid of the president. This is only part of the heritage Kadyrov has left to his successor. “I think that no one will touch the people he dragged out of the woods. No one will destabilize the situation. They believed the guarantees of safety and have nowhere to go, as there is no going back,” argued advisor to the Russian president Aslambek Aslakhanov in an interview with Expert. He then added, “I know that there is a theory that `the Chechens will destroy themselves.’ In part this is what happened. There are constant conflicts between the Ichkerians and the supporters of the Chechen Republic, but believe me, there will never be a real civil war. This is not a war; just skirmishes.”
In fact, many in the Russian political establishment saw the carte blanche Putin handed Kadyrov to bring peace and stability to Chechnya as a typical maneuver to turn the federal Chechen problem into a local one. As another high-ranking official told Expert, “No matter how cynical it sounds, the idea behind the Chechen project is obvious. This war needs to be stopped by the Chechens themselves, who are at each others’ throats, and not by the feds.”
That is exactly what has happened in Chechnya since. Federal troops have avoided the large-scale sweeps that became the main motivator behind a phenomenon new to Chechnya, the “widow’s terrorism” that shocked all of Russia and became a major factor in blackmailing the Kremlin on the eve of the Russian and Chechen presidential elections.
Kadyrov’s peacemaking tactics proved extremely effective in achieving the short-term goals of reducing the Chechnya conflict to “smoldering embers.” In return, the Kremlin was willing to sacrifice its long-term interests in the republic, by putting the Chechen oil complex under Kadyrov’s control, allowing Chechnya to become a “special economic zone,” and letting Kadyrov single-handedly appoint the Chechen cabinet. Taking advantage of his special trusted relationship with the Russian president, Kadyrov moved mountains: more than one Russian federal official sent to cool the fires of his ambition was forced to hightail it back to Moscow.

Helicopter rides

To be fair, Moscow’s reduced influence in Chechnya also happened for objective reasons. Stealing from state coffers, with folks in Moscow skimming off the cream, had taken on a systemic and completely incorrigible character. Any attempt to get the republic’s finances in order was fought not so much by Kadyrov as by the powerful Moscow lobby. The Kremlin heard reports of thousands of buildings being rebuilt. Putin’s helicopter ride over Grozny showed a different version of the story. “Though a lot is happening now, it looks terrible from a helicopter,” Putin stated when he arrived in the Chechen capital.
The desire to discover where the massive amount of compensation for destroyed homes is going makes sense, as few people in Chechnya have actually received compensation. The slowdown in payment appeared in the course of the federal test of the Chechen system for “taking over state money” that evolved under Kadyrov. While the Chechen Ministry of the Interior found no violations when double-checking the list of those requesting compensation, the federal Ministry of the Interior found several thousand false claims when it examined the same data. The run for the money in Chechnya became not a matter of survival, but one of death. The Chechen statehood newly resurrected under Kadyrov found a generous sponsor in Russia. Kadyrov moved step by step toward an agreement limiting the republic’s autonomy that would legally establish his right to do as he pleased with both natural resources inside the republic and monetary resources outside of it. Kadyrov’s logic is best conveyed in the words of former Ichkeria security service officer, Nadirsolta Elsunkaev. In reference to the constitutional referendum in Chechnya, he noted, “Sooner or later, Chechnya will become an independent state. But that is still far in the future. Without Russia, Chechnya will not get anywhere at the moment.”

Without Kadyrov

A Russian at the helm in Chechnya would put an end of the hopes of many Chechens, not just the deceased Kadyrov, of establishing an independent united Northern Caucasus, which would include Ingushetia and Dagestan in addition to Chechnya. The Kremlin’s current push to strengthen its hold on Russia’s regions could not have suited Kadyrov’s hidden agenda better. He insisted on discussing plans to reestablish Chechen-Ingushetia and more broadly to create a Northern Caucasus Territory. Doesn’t it make perfect common sense to set up a Muslim union right under Moscow’s nose in the name of strengthening Russian federalism? Troubled Chechnya was supposed to become the axis of this integration. Clearly, this was a long-term goal, but Kadyrov did not set up the Chechen system of rule with only a four-year term in mind. Just a few days before his death, he warned Chechens that Maskhadov’s threats to kill him or his son were empty: “If they kill me, someone else will take my place who will never let highway bandits rule in Chechnya ever again.”
The immediate appointment of lieutenant Ramzan as the Vice-Premier of the Chechen government is a likely sign from the Kremlin to his family and close supporters that Moscow is still in need of their services. To be blunt, the elimination of guerillas at the hands of Chechens must continue. The focus during the new presidential elections scheduled for September will one again be on a Chechen candidate, or at least that is the message coming from the powers that be. As there is no one equal to Kadyrov in Chechnya, Moscow’s influence in the republic will automatically increase, even if this is not one of the Kremlin’s goals. As cynical as this may sound, the complicated situation the Kremlin is in at the moment is actually one more chance to make some serious adjustments to Chechen politics. Without Kadyrov, to whom Putin had a kind of moral obligation, Moscow is the only contender for real power in Chechnya. The fate of this long suffering people depends on Moscow. The most important thing will be to make the right decisions.

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