Russian daily details pecking order in Kremlin administration
Yesterday Chief of Presidential Staff Dmitriy Medvedev signed a directive "On the allocation of duties among
Russian Federation presidential staff officials". The document is interesting primarily from the viewpoint of the
disposition of forces between the main Kremlin groups. The powers of the first deputy chief of staff, whose post has
been abolished, have been distributed virtually evenly between Mr Medvedev's two deputies - "silovik"
Igor Sechin and Vladislav Surkov, a representative of the "Family" group [First President Yeltsin's
relatives and associates]. However, in effect it is Mr Sechin who will now not only be the unofficial first deputy chief
of staff but also in all probability wield even greater influence than his immediate superior.
Vladimir Putin began the reform of his staff on 25 March by cutting the number of deputies to Dmitriy Medvedev from
seven to two and reducing the number of directorates via mergers. The subsequent personnel appointments showed that the
president, first, values old cadres and, second, is diligently maintaining within the staff the balance that took shape
under its former chief, Aleksandr Voloshin, between the main Kremlin groups. All five former deputies became aides to
the head of state with very broad powers, and either former leaders or their first deputies were appointed head of most
directorates.
Yesterday's directive from Mr Medvedev again confirmed Vladimir Putin's loyalty to his chosen course. This
course is most vividly illustrated by the provision concerning the powers of deputy chiefs of staff Igor Sechin and
Vladislav Surkov. Or, more accurately, by the precise way in which the duties formerly performed by the first deputy
chief of staff have been distributed between them. The post of first deputy, which was held by Dmitriy Kozak until he
departed to join the government, was abolished in March and the powers of the first deputy have been distributed between
the chief of staff and his two ordinary deputies.
At first glance the duties of first deputy have been "divided up" between Mr Sechin and Mr Surkov with
almost surgical precision. For instance, they will resolve two key issues - personnel and finance - on a parity basis.
Igor Sechin has been given the right to appoint and dismiss second-echelon leadership officials and also to sign labour
contracts on behalf of the staff. On the other hand Vladislav Surkov has been entrusted with managing budget money
within the framework of the estimate and signing civil legal contracts on behalf of the staff. The deputies will also on
an equal footing act as chief of staff in his absence and "ensure the coordinated activity of the president's
aides and advisers" on questions within their charge.
However, for all the apparent equality between Dmitriy Medvedev's two deputies, one of them will still be
somewhat "more equal". But not because of a deliberately unfair division of duties (both deputies retain their
former powers virtually in full) but because of the differing apparatus clout of the components in their charge. For
instance, his patronage of the presidential chancellery and the directorate for information and documentation provides
Igor Sechin with virtually daily "access" to the president, which is something that Vladislav Surkov can in no
way be guaranteed by the directorate for domestic policy under his command. Moreover, Igor Sechin's personal
closeness to Vladimir Putin, with whom he has worked since St Petersburg times, also sharply increases his importance
within the staff.
Dmitriy Medvedev also worked with Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg, but in terms of apparatus skill he is as yet
clearly inferior to his predecessor, Aleksandr Voloshin. Therefore the status of unofficial first deputy will enable Mr
Sechin to successfully take the place of his boss - de facto, if not de jure.
But the chief of staff does have a chance of increasing his apparatus clout. According to the directive, he takes
over a number of very important powers of his former first deputy, and the exercise of these should aid his career
development. He will be responsible for ensuring collaboration between the staff and the top judiciary,
Prosecutor-General's Office, Russian Federation government, and other federal organs of executive power and will
also exercise "overall leadership" of the activity of the president's chief of protocol and the drawing
up of the working schedule of the head of state. In addition, as before, the chief of staff will oversee the work of the
directorate for legal matters and control and the president's press secretary and coordinate the activities of the
president's plenipotentiary representatives in the federal districts.
The functions of the majority of the president's aides, who until the reorganization held posts as deputy chiefs
of staff, will remain unchanged. For instance, Viktor Ivanov will continue to oversee questions of personnel policy,
citizenship, pardons, and state awards, and also to coordinate the activities of the relevant components of the staff.
Igor Shuvalov will continue to be responsible for the work of the expert directorate (with which the economic
directorate, which he previously oversaw, has merged) and to provide organizational and information and analysis support
for the president's activities "on questions of the elaboration of national projects" (these were
formerly called "priority" projects). And Dzhakhan Pollyyeva will still head the activity of the
president's consultancy office and ensure the preparation of the draft annual messages of the head of state to the
Federal Assembly.
At the same time, within the framework of the fight against "parallelism in work", the president's
aides have lost their separate powers. For instance, Sergey Prikhodko, while continuing to coordinate the activity of
the foreign policy directorate, which he formerly headed, will no longer "organize the preparation of draft Russian
Federation presidential decisions on questions of military-technical cooperation" (admittedly, according to
information from Kommersant's sources, Mr Prikhodko has not displayed particular activeness in this sphere
recently). Aleksandr Abramov has been relieved of responsibility for the president's interaction with bodies of
state power in the Russian Federation components and bodies of local government (now Vladislav Surkov will look after
this), leaving him only with performing the duties of secretary of the State Council and preparing the president's
trips around the country. And Sergey Yastrzhembskiy no longer "exercises day-to-day leadership of the activity of
the information directorate" since he will have to concentrate on his job as the president's special
representative for questions of the development of relations with the EU.
The directive also spells out the powers of the nine presidential advisers. There is also a "first among
equals" among them - former Press Minister Mikhail Lesin.
He is the only one who not only "prepares analytical, reference, and informational material and
recommendations" regarding his own subject area but also oversees the work of a specific component - the council
for physical culture and sport. Although this is scarcely what the former minister was dreaming of when he accepted the
job of adviser.
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