After the defeat of al-Qaeda’s main bases in Afghanistan, it turned from a centralized terrorist organization into a global agency issuing licenses for terrorist acts to local operators

Shamsudin Mamaev

On March 10, Osama bin Laden turned 47. He most likely did not celebrate his birthday in the cave hidden in the mountains of Afghanistan (or Pakistan) but next morning trains were blown up in Madrid on his behalf, which resulted in a change in Spain’s government and a split in the global anti-terrorist coalition. Two and a half years ago, on September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda headed by bin Laden transformed American consciousness and shifted the development of the world history. The explosions on March 11, 2004 changed it essentially. It doesn’t matter any longer that bin Laden was physically unable to organize a new plot. He has simply become a symbol of the expanding world jihad. Even his capture would change nothing, just as nothing has changed for the better in Iraq since the arrest of Saddam Hussein.

The weakest link

On the morning of March 11, ten explosions hit Madrid at rush hour. About two hundred people were killed and about fifteen hundred injured. The bombs were detonated by means of a cellular phone and no suicide bombers were involved. This fact, as well as the use of the explosive titadyne favored by Basque terrorists, partly explains investigators’ initial delusion that ETA was responsible.
However, soon afterwards investigators discovered an unused cell phone-detonator and quickly traced to three Moroccans who sold such telephones. One of them happened to be Jamal Zougam who was already accused of links with al-Qaeda two years ago. Thus, the terrorist acts in Madrid were declared retribution for Iraq. In terms of accuracy of the attack’s timing and venue, as well as its psychological impact and political effect, the Madrid terrorist act with the attacks on the WTC and Pentagon. It also points to the fact that intellectual and organizational capacities of the world terrorist network have diminished little, if at all, since the beginning of the war against terrorism. The secret services of many countries are troubled by the same question: who is controlling the process now? 

Hunting symbols

The Americans have begun Operation Mountain Storm. Its official goal is to eliminate the leftover Taliban members and foreign militants who have settled in the area of Afghanistan bordering with Pakistan. Its unofficial goal, judging by leaks in the US press and by the thoroughness of preparations which began in the second half of February after CIA Director George Tenet’s visit to Afghanistan, is to capture or kill, before the November US presidential elections, all the bosses of the terrorist international, including Osama bin Laden himself, his closest assistant Ayman al-Zawahri and the Taliban’s leader Mullah Omar. As the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, which took responsibility for the terrorist acts in Madrid, stated, “Operations against America are now 90% ready.”
The US is preparing for the new operation with utmost seriousness. They intend to use the same algorithm as they did in capturing Saddam Hussein. It is based on thorough questioning and interrogation of the population in order to establish a complex cross network of kin ties to wanted terrorists.
The US Army has abandoned its former tactics of short-term raids to areas near borders and instead has begun to deploy platoons of 50 people in Pashtun villages to establish contacts with local inhabitants and safeguard international humanitarian workers.
Headed by Rear Admiral Bill McRaven, Task Force 121, founded only recently but already famous for capturing Saddam Hussein, is currently being moved to the border. To all appearances, McRaven will be personally responsible for catching or killing bin Laden.

Disagreement won’t mar their friendship

According to the Western press, the Americans have already exactly calculated the area where both al-Qaeda leaders are hiding. They received this information from Hasan Gul. Task Force 121 caught this al-Qaeda courier with the help of Kurdish militiamen in mid-January when he was crossing from Iraq to Iran. Among his possessions was a CD containing an address from Jordanian activist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to “worthy brothers and jihad leaders Osama bin Laden and his assistant Ayman al-Zawahri.” It is clear from this message that the defeat of al-Qaeda’s bases in Afghanistan and the isolation of its leaders in remote mountainous regions have changed the organization’s structure. On the one hand, al-Qaeda’s popularity has grown dramatically in the Islamic world. On the other hand, its leaders have virtually lost the possibility of managing it in a centralized way.
As a result, the centralized organization has disappeared: al-Qaeda has turned into an international terrorist movement. This movement grants “licenses” to independent local operators (in the Istanbul terrorist acts, al-Qaeda was represented by a Turkish terrorist group that had already existed for a long time, and in the terrorist acts in Morocco and Spain it was represented by a Moroccan cell).
To all appearances, the goal of al-Zarqawi, who wrote the abovementioned letter, was to obtain a “license” to carry out terrorist acts against Shiites in Iraq.
However, the most surprising thing comes at the end of the letter. Its author, mentioned in the report to the UN Security Council as al-Qaeda’s representative in Iraq and its liaison with Saddam Hussein, states, “If you agree with us and accept this as a program and a path, we will be your faithful soldiers. If you think differently, we are brothers, after all, and our disagreement will not mar our friendship…”
Apparently, al-Zarqawi never received consent from the al-Qaeda leaders he so respects for his attacks on Shiites in Karbala and Baghdad. First, his letter was intercepted, and second, al-Qaeda leaders condemned the terrorist acts the next day: “We urge all Moslems to dissociate themselves from this action,” their appeal runs. “Mojahedins don’t take the life that Allah declared sacred except for the sake of a just cause. They don’t kill heretical Shiite groups if they don’t offend the Prophet’s brothers-in-arms.” All this was voiced after the fact – after the blood of absolutely innocent people, even according al-Qaeda itself, had been shed. This case proves that the international Islamic terror hasn’t been administered from a single center for quite some time. It doesn’t have a single strategy or ideology, except for the general idea of jihad. In this new form, it is even more dangerous to humanity.

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