Four main versions of the tragedy on February 14 at Moscow’s Transvaal water park have appeared over the last week. The first is that the water park’s dome might have fallen because of a bad vapor seal and ventilation system. As Evgeni Goregliad of Goregliad Consulting Engineering Company told Expert, thermodynamic effects in enclosed spaces are one of the most important engineering problems to solve. Goregliad believes that a combination of the indoor and outdoor temperature difference, chlorine evaporation, as well as high humidity and insufficient ventilation might have led the corrosion of support structures and their collapse.
The fact that the building has only been in use for year and a half is the main argument against this version. Many experts are confident that this was not enough time for concrete to change its properties. The water park’s owners swear that they have been operating it properly and complied with all ventilation requirements.
The second version is that the tragedy might have been caused by a designer incorrectly calculating the geometry of the complexly shaped dome and the strength of its bearings. Even minute errors in load calculations, in theory, could result in roof collapse. However, Nodar Kancheli, the chief designer of the dome (he has been involved in designing many new Moscow buildings, including the dome of the Christ Savior Cathedral and the Atrium above Gostiny Dvor), has already made a statement that his office analyzed the project and didn’t find any mistakes. He is confident that the designers are not to blame. Moreover, project documentation was approved by all the appropriate authorities and designers received all required approvals from officials at the Moscow Architectural Committee. Moscow experts even recognized the water park as “the best implemented investment and construction project of 2002.”
The third possible cause for the Transvaal collapse may lie in a gross defect in its construction. Either the building was constructed improperly or poor quality materials were used. However, there is as yet no proof that low quality materials were used to construct Transvaal. At present, construction errors seem quite plausible, if only because similar things have happen around the world. For example, a dome-shaped stadium roof collapsed in 1970s in Czechoslovakia.
The last version assumes that the dome fell on water park patrons because the building’s foundation had shifted. The building was built on fill over underground springs and a formerly aboveground brook. It is likely that the site was inadequately prepared for construction, and as the fill was exposed to moisture, it sank together with the foundation. One of the pillars couldn’t bear the load and collapsed. After that, the whole dome broke. “Of course, roofs are exposed to external and internal tensions,” Vladimir Markov, Deputy Chairman of the Board at Tekhnonikol Company, explains. “Some design miscalculations or defects are possible when installing a roof. But they would have to be monstrous to make a roof tumble down in a year and a half. This is very unlikely. But if part of the foundation `drifted’, then everything is clear. If a foundation drifts, a building like Transvaal collapses like a house of cards.” Most arguments now available support this very version. Witnesses recount that first the column “drifted” and then so did the ceiling. Further evidence in favor of this version is the deep crack that has appeared in the remaining part of the building and is gradually deepening. 

Palaces built of sand

The tragedy at Transvaal has confirmed what everybody has long suspected. The two hundred permits and agreements required to build any large building in Moscow by no means guarantee the quality of design and construction. Moreover, these administrative barriers, raised by officials under the pretense of public safety, have become a real hazard to people’s life and health. This is no paradox. It is obvious that there is always some critical administrative requirement threshold beyond which it simply becomes impossible to work honestly. According to Moscow developers, bribes to officials for a variety of services account for about 25% of construction costs. It is ridiculous to think that design estimates “garnished” with a fat envelope stuffed with dollars undergo any serious examination at all. Moreover, it is extremely common for builders to collect the required signatures after construction is already underway. One could ask why experts call “drifted” soil the most probable cause for Transvaal’s collapse, if under current regulations a construction permit is only issued after a geological survey. Yet Vadim Mikhailov, a member of the commission investigating the causes of the catastrophe and the head of Excavation Rescue (Diggerspas) at the Ministry of Emergencies, stated publicly last week that “land surveying at the development site was not carried out prior to construction.” How is this possible? Everybody knows: a geological survey certificate has long been pure formality. Most frequently, it is simply bought. At best, a minimum of purely formal inspections is conducted.
For the present, there are no grounds to hope that the Transvaal tragedy will bring change. True, Moscow officials are now looking as busy as possible. Investigations are under way, and officials are promising to carry out across-the-board inspections and bring the wrath of heaven down on those who don’t comply. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov admitted that the Moscow government is partially responsible for the tragedy and hinted at coming administrative measures. St. Pete is not far behind. Valentina Matvienko, Governor of St. Petersburg, signed a decree aimed at bringing order to investment and construction in St Petersburg. Officials will check technical conditions at all projects under construction in the city within one month and determine whether all required expert inspections have been properly conducted.
Developers, in turn, voiced their willingness to give the authorities all possible assistance. However, developers have a philosophical attitude toward the coming wave of inspections, on the whole. They believe as soon as a scapegoat is found, for example, designers, everything will calm down. “Maybe construction codes will get tougher, but that will only result in increased housing costs,” one analyst of the real estate market reasons. “Demand will not drop no matter what.”

The path to safety

However, it is probable that this time federal authorities will not let the case drop and will take the opportunity to establish order in the capital construction sector. To this end, it is necessary to radically cut down the number of supervisory and licensing authorities while at the same time toughening responsibility for violations.
Even if the number of required inspections and agreements is to be reduced to a minimum, the authorities will not achieve rapid improvement in construction quality. Firstly, there is virtually no one to conduct full-fledged expert inspections. Secondly, in order to check construction projects for compliance, norms must exist and must be up-to-date. The Russian regulatory code is behind the times today. For example, construction standards for roof design were established back in 1976. 
Gosstroi (State Committee on Construction) has been responsible for developing new building codes for six years now. Yet things are right there where they started. Furthermore, there are no documents at all laying out the construction and operating rules for many types of structures, including indoor water parks. Designers are guided by Western standards which sometimes do not take into consideration all Russian specific features, including climate. Gosstroi hasn’t gotten around to developing regulations, although water parks have been under construction across Russia, including in regions with even harsher climates than Moscow, for more than a year now. Even more outrageously, despite the rapid development of high-rise apartment buildings in Moscow, there are no rules regulating construction of buildings of more than 75 meters or 20-25 floors in height among current regulations. So, along with mud raking, officials need to completely redraft the construction code. Where they will find the experts to complete this task in the near future is absolutely unclear.

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