26 November 2003 03:20
Is Moscow the Main Power Broker in Georgia?
Eduard Shevardnadze's leadership was critical to securing Georgian independence in the early 1990s. But over the
years the Georgian president became an inept leader, whose circle included many extremely corrupt individuals. Though
the United States provided $1.5 billion of aid over the last decade, Georgia was unable to emerge from political
instability, economic stagnation, and poverty. By the time he resigned on Sunday, under pressure from mass protests,
opposition to him had grown throughout the country. After he went on television to announce his departure, the country
exploded with joy.
The bad news is that Shevardnadze is the second post-Soviet Georgian president unable to finish his term in office.
The fear is that removing an unpopular leader extra-constitutionally could become the norm, leading many to question
whether it is possible for Georgia to ever have stable constitutional government. More bad news is that Russia could
emerge as the power broker in this republic formerly ruled by Moscow. To make things worse, preventing looting, economic
collapse and chaos will be difficult for the new government.
The constitution will be followed in one area. According to the document, when a president resigns, the speaker of
parliament assumes the post for 45 days, when new elections must take place. Therefore, Nino Burdzhanadze, who led the
street protests along with two other opposition leaders, Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania, will assume the post on
an interim basis.
However, Burdzhanadze's constitutional legitimacy is already being questioned. She was speaker of parliament
before the election of Nov. 2 -- which was rife with fraud, leading to the demonstrations of this past weekend that
toppled Shevardnadze -- and it isn't clear she is entitled to hold that post today. For the moment, all of
Georgia's political forces and the international community have recognized Burdzhanadze's authority. But
whether she is truly in control and will be able to stabilize the country in light of the president's resignation
remain open questions.
It also remains to be seen whether Georgia can hold truly democratic elections within 45 days, especially because
those who led the protests have different political interests. At least two are striving to be president, Burdzhanadze
and Saakashvili. Roughly, there seem to be three groups in Georgian political society: the victorious opposition,
supporters of Shevardnadze, and those (probably a majority) who opposed both the former president and the
revolution.
Exacerbating the weakness of the Georgian state and the opposition's newly gained authority is the terrible
heritage that Shevardnadze leaves. The new leadership has to deal with rampant corruption and a huge economic and social
crisis. Georgia's $500 million budget has a $150 million deficit, making it impossible for the government to pay
salaries and pensions or provide even basic government services.
During this entire crisis, preoccupied with a plethora of foreign problems, Washington has been both disinterested
and in the dark. The State Department's official statement issued after the election results were finalized last
week made no overall comment on the legitimacy of the elections, but did voice justified disappointment and unhappiness
over fraud and irregularities. While some officials in the Bush administration, fed up with Shevardnadze's
inability to govern, were privately supportive of his resignation, Secretary of State Colin Powell telephoned
Shevardnadze to voice support for his government on Saturday, the very day the protesters occupied the parliament
building.
Russia, for its part, played an enormous role in the events of the weekend. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was in
Tbilisi on Sunday and his first public action was to visit the rally and speak at the demonstration with protest leaders
by his side. Ivanov's intervention was pivotal. Whereas before this incident, opposition leaders spoke both
publicly and privately about the need to find a compromise solution to the standoff, Ivanov's public gesture of
support significantly strengthened their position. Ultimately, it was Ivanov who played a crucial role in convincing
Shevardnadze to resign. In return, as Burdzhanadze's first comments about the special need to improve relations
with Russia suggest, the opposition leaders had to accept Moscow's influence over affairs in Georgia.
After Shevardnadze resigned, Ivanov traveled to Georgia's autonomous province of Adzharia, whose leader Aslan
Abashidze depends on Moscow. After the visit, Abashidze, who had organized parallel demonstrations to counter the
opposition protests and had threatened to declare independence if the opposition won, made surprisingly mild remarks
about Burdzhanadze's assumption of authority.
As a result, the opposition leaders who are now in charge owe a huge debt of gratitude to Russia. They also need
Russia to supply Georgia with gas and electricity if the country is to get through the winter. Finally, Russia can exert
significant influence over various paramilitary groups that had disintegrated in the last few years, but which regrouped
during the political crisis. All of which means that Russian influence has significantly increased. Moscow's
interest has always been to create chaos in the country and to make the government dependent on Russia. In many ways,
Moscow's policy has finally succeeded.
It is therefore critical for Washington and other Western capitals to articulate a clear policy toward Georgia.
First, the United States and EU must help ensure that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe oversee
the next vote. The new Georgian government will not be capable of holding truly democratic elections with its own
resources. Second, the international community must call on the leaders who have taken charge to put their reformist
messages to work by implementing serious changes.
The United States and Europe must pursue a wait-and-see approach when it comes to significantly increasing financial
assistance to the new government until after the elections, to prevent the new authorities from being able to use this
aid to influence the next vote. Washington must move quickly to counter Russian influence in Georgia by strengthening
ties not only with the three opposition leaders who have taken power, but also with those opposition and business
figures who are pro-American.
To begin implementing this policy, the Bush administration should send a high-level official to Georgia to work with
all sides involved (the revolutionary opposition, the more moderate opposition and supporters of Shevardnadze) to ensure
that the situation in Georgia stabilizes. Georgia saw tremendous turmoil in the early 1990s; a similar spiral into
disorder is possible again. If disarray develops, only Russian interests benefit.
Irakly Areshidze, a political analyst based in Washington and Tbilisi, was a senior campaign strategist for the
center-right New Rights Party. This comment is reprinted from Tuesday's The Wall Street Journal.
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